Floods have devastated the tarai. Thousands are displaced and almost a hundred people have died. But like the Kashmir earthquake and the tsunami in Sri Lanka, the human tragedy offered an opportunity for conflicting sides to build bridges.

The state could have used the moment to reach out to the alienated madhesi population. A sincere relief program with effective use of international assistance, an appeal to agitating groups to come on board and mobilisation of madhesi civil society as interlocutors would have helped create an environment for engagement.

But given the government's track record in dealing with the madhes, it is not surprising that nothing of the sort happened. What is more telling is the reaction of the madhesi groups. The MJF came out with one statement days after the flooding began, and its district units have done little to organise assistance. The armed groups neither declared a ceasefire nor directed activists to work for relief.

Instead, they exploited the weakness of an over-stretched state machinery to continue with killings, abductions, and looting adding to the misery of the people they claim to represent.

When political entrepreneurs rely solely on identity chauvinism, they lose sight of the other factors that affect people's lives. The response illustrates all that is wrong with the madhesi movement: crisis of leadership, lack of a coherent political agenda, limited organisational strength and their inability and unwillingness to engage in true mass politics. These weaknesses prevent madhesi outfits from filling the political vacuum in the tarai, besides posing a roadblock to serious negotiations.

Just look at the government-MJF talks: the lack of progress has as much to do with MJF's internal problems as the government's unwillingness to compromise.

Upendra Yadav is trapped. If he strikes a deal, he will be seen as having sold out, if he walks out he will need to resume the movement. The problem is people are not in an agitation mood right now, and he has little to go back to. The MJF's organisation is in shambles. It has not been able to capitalise on the brand recognition it won after the movement. Its tactical blunders have made district-level political figures reluctant to join the party and its Yadav pre-dominance had bred resentment among other castes.

Upendra Yadav himself has been out of the tarai for more than five weeks, first in the US and then in Kathmandu, at a time when he should have been focussing on recruitment and mobilisation. Instead, he is happy shifting goalposts and prolonging the deadlock. The only explanation for why MJF is not acting with more urgency is because the leadership, like many in the tarai, is convinced that elections will not happen in November because the major parties don't want it.

The Forum is relying more on raw anger in the tarai for the next round of confrontation than thinking of building the party machine for polls.

The other groups suffer from similar weaknesses. Goit is a respected political figure but does not keep well and has a weak organisation. He appears more committed to the idea of secession but admits that the next generation will have to take the struggle forward. Jwala Singh is more active and has expanded his organisation rapidly, but at the cost of including more criminals. Neither leader has a pan-tarai appeal or a large popular base though there is increasing acceptance of armed action.

Both Goit and Jwala expressed willingness for talks in the past realising it would give them legitimacy. They had even declared a ceasefire but the government snubbed the initiative. They feel insulted and now appear more reluctant to negotiate, at least in the absence of certain preconditions. The armed factions have calculated that the government will not give in on any major issue, and they can instead capitalise on the radicalisation on the ground. But this attitude can change and they may come for at least one round of talks if the government creates the environment and Madhesi civil society exerts pressure.

The madhesi movement is fractured, disorganised, and directionless. But there is anger firing it still. Faultlines are getting deeper and confrontation between the state and madhesis, Maoists and madhesi groups, and between hill-origin people and madhesis is likely in some form. The weaknesses of the madhesi groups shouldn't make anyone in Kathmandu complacent about the gravity of the situation.