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It makes no sense to tolerate a deepening humanitarian crisis throughout the countryside if and when the crisis can and should be avoided politically in Kathmandu. In Geneva, the resolution passed by the UN Human Rights Commission in 2005 created momentum for human rights monitoring. Let us build on this by adding a well-coordinated international effort to foster a meaningful peace process.
Just peace has to come from within the country. Only an alliance of non-armed democratic forces will be able to constructively handle the present polarisation and overcome the political impasse. Only a democratic movement made up of trustworthy personalities and innovative institutions can urge the two extremes to the mainstream. In the past, bilateralism was equal to confrontation: the palace and the parties boosted the Maoist rebellion. Together they launched a repressive and militarised answer by the palace. At the end of the day, the victims of both strategies are the democratic forces and rural Nepalis.
The Maoists have already declared their interest and political will to join the mainstream. I believe them: the cadre don't want to grow old as hermits in the Himalaya. The 12-point understanding is a necessary but not sufficient manifestation of this will. Further proof is needed during a second and third round of talks. Details have to be nailed down as precisely as possible.
If there is no military solution to Nepal's civil war, we have to recognise the Maoists as a political party at the negotiation table. However, to require rebels to give up their weapons before beginning negotiations is tantamount to asking them to surrender prior to an agreement and therefore essentially the same as supporting a military solution.
The king is crucial to a peace process. It is in His Majesty's hands to use his absolutistic power for a responsible and constitutionally correct solution. He might offer the political parties a 12-point understanding in which all the major steps for a peace process are addressed: framework conditions for a ceasefire, sovereignty of the people, civil and political rights guarantees, human rights, elections to national and local bodies, the role of a constitutional monarchy.
The seven parties will be in a position to compare the two understandings, one on the armed conflict and one on the constitutional crisis. They might further facilitate in a democratic way those points in which the two understandings diverge. This constitutes a major step forward towards a more comprehensive peace process. Early in the process there must be an understanding about a ceasefire, disarmament and reintegration. International security guarantees might also be needed.
What if the democratic forces do not succeed and the palace remains adamant? The parties are well advised to continue their dialogue about the next steps with the Maoists. In case the latter are not serious about giving up arms? At that point a democratically mobilised society would then be both willing and able to marginalise the warriors completely.
Although peace has to come from a strong democratic platform in Nepal itself the on-going armed conflict can't be handled without external support and peace-building. The three rounds of talks between 2001-2003 have clearly highlighted the difficult role local facilitators had to play. Since then, there were several initiatives by the UN as well as by bilateral actors to facilitate negotiations, to open up channels between the conflicting parties, to establish back channels, to be in a stand-by mode, to facilitate meetings, to hold seminars or to network behind the scenes.
However, it seems that there was no role or no interest from the international community to address the conflict at a track-one level in a more systematic and coherent way. There is not only a single role for external actors to play: there are different roles that have to be taken up by different actors. What is needed is a coherent, coordinated and well-balanced approach that uses the strengths, balances the weaknesses and helps to make an enabling peace initiative acceptable for all stakeholders.
Nobody likes a bunch of strange foreigners in their garden. We have to be modest and clear in our advice. Confusing and weak signals might trigger the opposite of what we would like to achieve: a democratic and just peace in one of the most beautiful countries on earth.
G?nther Baechler, PhD in Conflict Analysis, is Special Adviser for Peace Building in Nepal of the Swiss Foreign Ministry
